Tag Archives: durability

Reading Group. Protocol-Aware Recovery for Consensus-Based Storage

Our last reading group meeting was about storage faults in state machine replications. We looked at the “Protocol-Aware Recovery for Consensus-Based Storage” paper from FAST’18. 

The paper explores an interesting omission in most of the state machine replication (SMR) protocols. These protocols, such as (multi)-Paxos and Raft, are specified with the assumption of having a crash-resistant disk to write the operation log and voting metadata. This disk data allows crashed nodes to restart safely. However, the real-life gets in a way a bit, as infallible storage is as real as unicorns. 

Storage may fail in peculiar ways, when some data may get corrupted, while most other data is correct and the server itself continues working. The problem here is handling such failures. The simplest way is to treat the server as crashed. However, the server must remain crashed, as restarting may get into even more severe state corruption, as the server replays the operations from a faulty log. The paper talks about a variety of other approaches taken to deal with these data issues. The authors state that all the mechanisms they have explored were faulty and led to liveness or safety issues. I personally do not buy such a blanket statement, but a few of the examples in the paper were really interesting. 

The paper then suggests a solution – Protocol-Aware Recovery (PAR). The main point here is to avoid ad-hoc solutions because they are either slow, unsafe, complicated, or all of the above. This makes sense since such a big omission (potential for data-corrupting disk failures) in protocols should be addressed at the protocol level. The paper draws heavily on the Raft state machine protocol and develops the recovery procedure for it.

The log recovery is leader-based and can be broken down into two sub-protocols: follower recovery and leader recovery. The followers are recovered by restoring the data from the leader who always knows of all the committed history. Leader recovery is a bit more tricky and occurs as part of a leader election. Of course, if a non-faulty node can be elected a leader, then recovering faulty nodes is easy with the follower recovery. However, the leader election requires a node to have the most up-to-date log to become a leader, limiting a selection of nodes for the job. That being said, the node can be elected with a corrupted log, but it needs to recover the corrupted entries from the followers. If the entry is not available on any of the followers, the state machine becomes stuck (as it should). The protocol only recovers committed log entries and follows Raft logic to discard non-committed log suffix if it has corrupted entries. 

In addition, to log recovery, the paper also talks about snapshot recovery. The idea behind snapshot recovery is to make sure all nodes take the same snapshots at the same index in the log, break them into “chunks” and recover chunks as needed from other nodes. 

Here is the presentation by Rohan Puri:


1) The need for logs? The paper assumes that a state machine takes periodic snapshots to a disk/drive, and such snapshot in combination with a log can be used for node recovery later. This implies that the actual current state of the state machine can be lost due to a server restart. However, some state machines are directly backed by the disk, in essence, representing a rolling snapshot that gets updated every time an operation from the log applies. Recovery of such disk-backed state machine can be quicker and require only log entries happening after the crash/restart. Of course, this does not mean that the disk-backed state machine itself cannot be corrupted. In any case, the log entries are required for recovery and can be garbage collected once all nodes have persisted the state machine to disk (either as part of normal operation or a snapshot), making the time-frame for the log entries to remain useful to be relatively small. 

A more interesting problem may arise in trying to recover the corrupted state machine. If we rely on this “rolling-snapshot” disk-backed state machine, the mechanism the paper uses for snapshot recovery won’t work, since different copies of the state machine may be misaligned ever-so-slightly. Of course, one can always do the costly node restore procedure — restore to some prior snapshot and replay the log, but this is wasteful and requires keeping an extra snapshot and log from the snapshot onwards. In the spirit of the paper, we should rely on distributed copies instead and be able to restore the corruption without relying on storing redundant copies on the same server

2) Persistent memory vs RAM and recovery for in-memory SMR. If we build a state machine replication (SMR) to work purely off RAM, then we do not have the luxury of retaining any state after a restart. As such, in-memory state machines must have different mechanisms to ensure safety. For example, in traditional Multi-Paxos with a disk, a node always remembers the current term/ballot and past votes it has participated in. Without durable memory, a node restart erases the previous voting state, allowing a node to vote on something it has already voted on before, but with a lower term/ballot. This is not safe and may lead to a double-commit on the same log entry when a node promises to some new leader, and then after restart makes a second promise in the same log index to some older leader. 

Allowing for corruption in persistent memory is somewhat similar to not having persistent memory at all, at least when dealing with crashes/restarts. The very piece of data/metadata we need to ensure safety and avoid double voting as in the example above may be corrupted and cannot be used after a restart. However, the same precautions used for in-memory replicated state machines will work with corrupted storage as well and allow for safe recovery. For example, to prevent the double-voting example, a recovering node needs to run a “mock” leader election (or a leader election with a term guaranteed to not succeed). Such leader election will ensure the node gets a proper view of the current ballot/term in the cluster to make sure it no longer accepts votes from prior leaders. After such a mock election, the node can start accepting/voting for log entries while recovering any prior log and/or state machine from any of the replicas. Of course, the full recovery completes when enough data is shipped from other nodes (i.e. snapshots + missing log entries). 

There are a few differences between RAM and persistent storage when it comes to recovery. First of all, while it seems like both can lose data (one due to a reboot, another due to some random corruption), persistent storage still has a hint of data being missing. This is like not remembering what the node has voted for or who was the leader, but still having a 6th sense that something was voted upon. This extra piece of information may be useful in recovery, and indeed the protocol from the paper takes advantage of that to improve fault tolerance and safety. The recovery protocol preserves safety when the majority of nodes fail at the same log index, as the protocol knows something is missing entirely and will halt for safety. In the RAM setting, a mass reboot (i.e. majority of nodes) leads to a collective loss of memory without any hint that something may have been agreed upon, leading to a rewrite of the log. 

The second difference is that persistent memory may not lose all the data, so fewer items must be shipped from the followers. 

3) Leader-bound recovery. The paper suggests recovering followers from the leader node. This can put more load on the leader, who is already a bottleneck in the protocol. It seems like it may be possible to recover committed log entries from followers (the paper already does so for leader recovery) to make the recovery procedure less demanding for the leader.

4) Byzantine. The paper touches a bit on this topic. Data corruption on disk can be viewed through the lens of Byzantine fault tolerance. The corruption causes a node to act outside of the protocol specs, and byzantine-tolerant protocols are designed to handle such “out-of-spec” behaviors. The paper is a good example of how we can often solve some specific types of byzantine behaviors without resorting to the full-blown PBFT-style solutions. This is very practical, as we want the state machine to handle data corruptions, but we do not want to pay the performance penalty associated with BFT protocols. 

5) Luckilyhood of data corruption. Another point of discussion was around the likelihood of such data-faults happening. It does not seem like these are too frequent, but they do happen. We touched on a few anecdotal occurrences. For example, some firmware issues causing the disk to not write some large buffers of data. 

It is also worth noting error correction. Error correction is standard for server-grade memory, and it comes at a relatively small monetary/performance cost. Similar error-correction technologies are used in disks and drives, allowing for small errors (i.e. a bit-flip) to be fixed by the drive. In fact, NAND flash SSDs rely on error correction in normal operation.

6) Infallible disk. Protocols assume disk is always correct. Why? Even on the surface, this does not come as a super tight assumption. And especially on the scale of millions of SMR instances deployed across millions of machines.

Reading Group

Our reading groups takes place over Zoom every Wednesday at 2:00 pm EST. We have a slack group where we post papers, hold discussions and most importantly manage Zoom invites to the papers. Please join the slack group to get involved!